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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in an information age.  Thanks to the Internet and 
search engines such as Google,
1
 never before in history has it been so 
easy to access so much information so quickly.  With the advent of 
wireless technology and smartphones, we are becoming accustomed 
to finding answers online anywhere, at any time, and are exposed to 
more information than ever before in history.  The Internet is replete 
 
 ∗ The term “delegalization” was coined by Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise 
in their article, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 
(2000). 
 ∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law.  I am 
grateful for the ongoing support received from Temple Law School, as well as for the 
excellent feedback from Lee Carpenter, Andrea Monroe, Kristen Murray, and David 
Thomson.  Special thanks to Kari Swenson, Alex Latanision, and Laura Adams for 
their excellent research assistance. 
 1 GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  
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with websites designed to provide ready answers to questions.
2
  In-
deed, the Internet has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as 
“a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed pub-
lications.”
3
  Wikipedia, for example, is one of the largest encyclope-
dias ever created and is among the ten most-visited websites.
4
  Our 
first instinct when confronted with something we don’t know is to 
jump online to the “irresistible and indispensable ultimate answer-
finder” and search out the answer to our question.
5
  For most ques-
tions, the answer can be found quickly and easily. 
The majority of those individuals born in the United States since 
approximately 1965 have had this kind of ready access to information 
for most of their adult lives.
6
  Those on the younger end of the spec-
trum have used computers since childhood.
7
  These individuals, col-
lectively members of Generation X
8
 and Generation Y (or Mille-
nials),
9
 comprise the vast majority of law school graduates in the last 
fifteen to twenty years.  The incoming generations of law students, 
the “digital natives,” have never known a world without ready access 
to information via the Internet.
10
  It is no surprise, then, that the 
technological abilities of recent generations of law school graduates 
have wrought changes at all levels of the legal field, from day-to-day 
law practice, to legal academic scholarship, to judicial decision-
making.
11
 
 
 2 See, e.g., ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); 
POLLDADDY, http://answers.polldaddy.com/ (last visited July 14, 2010); POLLSTER, 
http://pollster.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); WIKIANSWERS, 
http://wiki.answers.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); YAHOO! ANSWERS, 
 http://answers.yahoo.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
 3 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). 
 4 Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (last visited Apr. 
11, 2011). 
 5 Molly McDonough, In Google We Trust?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2004, at 30 (describing 
Google). 
 6 See Joan Catherine Bohl, Generations X and Y in Law School: Practical Strategies for 
Teaching the “MTV/Google” Generation, 54 LOY. L. REV. 775, 779 (2008).  
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 778 (defining Generation X roughly as those people born between 1965 
and 1982). 
 9 Id. (defining Millenials as those born between 1977 and 2003). 
 10 Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 
53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 912 (2009) (noting that those who have grown up with 
these technologies since childhood, the “digital natives,” are currently making their 
way into law schools). 
 11 Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 223, 
224 (2008). 
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One of the most dramatic changes to legal practice as a result of 
the rise of the Internet is the transition to online legal research.  It is 
now well documented that practicing lawyers conduct the vast majori-
ty of their research on the web.
12
  The nature of electronic search 
technology has brought about many changes in the research process 
itself.
13
  It is not unexpected or surprising that lawyers accustomed to 
jumping online for the answers to all of their questions of a personal 
nature prefer to go online for their legal research as well. 
What is less clear is the extent to which, if at all, electronic re-
search is changing the nature of the law and legal reasoning itself.
14
  
While the medium of legal research may have changed, by and large, 
the source material has been assumed to remain relatively stable.
15
  
Lawyers’ stock in trade—cases, statutes, and regulations—have long 
been the primary sources for supporting legal analysis.  While there is 
no doubt that these sources remain the predominant tools for sup-
porting legal analysis, there are signs that their primacy is beginning 
to weaken and that, increasingly, nontraditional sources are being 
used to support legal analysis. 
This blurring of the line between traditional and nontraditional 
sources is due in large part to the transition from print-based to on-
line research.  The print-based system of legal authority provided le-
gal researchers with a sense of the law as a separate and distinct do-
main.
16
  Today’s researchers, without the print-based frame of 
reference, do not see the separation and are more likely to turn to 
the nontraditional sources that provide substantive support for their 
analysis.  These nontraditional sources have become a new form of 
 
 12 See Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research Training: Preparing Students for a Rapid-
ly Changing Research Environment, 13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 241, 246–
48 (2007); Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari—Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the 
Web, 10 YALE J.L.& TECH. 82, 108–09 (2007). 
 13 See generally Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: 
A Paradigm Shift?, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2001) (discussing the effect of computer-
assisted legal research on legal thinking); Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the 
World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2000) (arguing that the 
changing habits of the new generation of lawyers due to technology changes demon-
strate a change in the way we think about the law); see also Kuh, supra note 11, at 224; 
Margolis, supra note 12, at 107. 
 14 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 285 n.2 (noting the difficulty of ascertaining the 
relationship between the organization of legal material and the development of law 
itself); Kuh, supra note 11, at 226 (noting that little scholarly effort has gone into un-
derstanding the consequences of electronic legal research). 
 15 See Berring, supra note 13, at 306. 
 16 F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed 
the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 571 (2002). 
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authority and are changing the face of judicial opinions and possibly 
the law itself. 
The blurring of the line between legal and nonlegal authority 
can be seen in recent judicial opinions.  A quick look through a mul-
titude of opinions reveals that the majority of citations are to tradi-
tional sources such as statutes and cases.  While research shows that 
lawyers are accessing these materials online, citation rules require 
that the print version be cited in legal documents when a print ver-
sion exists.
17
  Thus, many citations in judicial opinions reference the 
traditional sources of authority—print codes and reporters that con-
tain statutes and cases, respectively.  At the same time, the number of 
citations to electronic sources has increased significantly.
18
  Because 
the citation rules require print versions to be cited when available, 
the citations to electronic sources are more than likely something 
other than traditional legal authority.  Thus, there has been a dramat-
ic increase in the citation to nonlegal authority of all kinds, both in 
print and online.
19
  Few scholars have looked at the degree to which 
the information revolution and changes in the legal research process 
are contributing to the rise of electronic citation in judicial opinions, 
but at a minimum, the presence of these citations reinforces the no-
tion that such sources can be used as authority. 
This Article will look at the effect of electronic research on the 
use of authority in legal analysis and suggest that electronic search 
technology, along with easy access to information (both legal and 
nonlegal) on the Internet, is contributing to a loosening of the firm 
boundaries between legal authority and nonlegal information,
20
 thus 
changing our collective understanding of authority.  Part II will ad-
dress the nature of authority and show that our understanding of au-
 
 17 See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 18.2, at 165 (Columbia 
Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010); ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A 
PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 38.1, at 291 (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2006). 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization 
of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 500–03, 501 tbl.1 (2000).  See also Coleen M. Barger, On 
the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417, 428 (2002); Tina S. Ching, The Next Generation of Legal Cita-
tions: A Survey of Internet Citations in the Opinions of the Washington Supreme Court and 
Washington Appellate Courts, 1999–2005, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 387, 391–94, tbls.1, 2 
& 5 (2007); John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme 
Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427, 429–31, 431 tbl.1 (2002). 
 20 This article does not purport to attribute the sole responsibility of changing 
the nature of legal authority to electronic research.  That process is too complex to 
be attributed to a single cause.  I do suggest, however, that electronic research plays a 
significant role in this process. 
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thority is rooted in a print-based system and vocabulary.  Part III will 
describe electronic search technology and suggest that locating in-
formation online is accelerating the blurring of the line between le-
gal and nonlegal authority by masking the print-based distinctions 
among different kinds of authority.  Part IV will provide a snapshot of 
electronic citations in judicial opinions and show that they reflect the 
changes in legal authority discussed above.  Part V will address the 
implications of these findings for the future of legal research and le-
gal reasoning and call for a new system for defining authority that re-
flects the electronic world of legal information. 
II. WHAT IS AUTHORITY? 
“Authority” is the building block of any legal analysis.  The 
common law system is built on the concept of precedent, used as au-
thority, to develop the law and dictate future legal decisions.  Yet “au-
thority” is a complex concept, not easily boiled down to a simple de-
finition.  At a very broad level, this paper suggests that authority is 
anything used as support for legal analysis in writing.  This Part will 
review the different types of authority typically recognized in the lite-
rature as they relate to legal research and analysis. 
A. Traditional Legal Authority21 
Law is a field that depends on authority.  The common law tradi-
tion at the basis of our legal system is “said to be obsessed with the ci-
tation of authorities.”
22
  From the very beginning of law school, law 
students are taught about legal authority.  Every legal research text 
begins with an overview of the sources of law and types of authority.
23
  
In their legal research and writing classes, law students are taught 
how to find and use authority to analyze issues and form legal argu-
ments.  The focus of that instruction is traditional legal authority—
statutes, cases, regulations, treatises, law review articles, and legislative 
history. 
 
 21 While the concept of “authority” seems very basic, and the material covered in 
this section is mastered by even the most inexperienced law students, it is important 
to clearly lay the groundwork in order to show the ways in which technology is chang-
ing these fundamental concepts. 
 22 Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
1, 36 (2009). 
 23 See, e.g., STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 1–9 (9th 
ed. 2009); LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, JUST RESEARCH 17–20 (2d ed. 
2009); KENT C. OLSON, PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL RESEARCH 5–8 (2009); AMY E. SLOAN, 
BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES 2–9 (4th ed. 2009). 
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Sources are considered “authority” because of where they come 
from as much as for what they say.  A judicial opinion from a control-
ling court carries authority because it is the decision of the court, re-
gardless of the strength and logic of the reasoning.  This idea, that a 
source must be honored because of its author or origin, rather than 
its content, is at the very heart of legal authority.
24
  Traditional legal 
authority is produced by lawyers, primarily judges and legal academ-
ics, for use by other lawyers, judges, and legal academics.  For much 
of this country’s history, authority has come from a finite group of au-
thors and has been published in a “stable universe of settled 
sources,”
25
 such as case reporters, code compilations, treatises, and 
law reviews.  Legal authority has been inextricably bound up with the 
books in which it appears.  The combination of the author and the 
book in which the source is published has traditionally given legal re-
searchers an easy way to identify “authority.” 
One of the first things novice lawyers are taught about authority 
is the difference between primary authority (statutes, cases, regula-
tions, etc.) and secondary authority (treatises, law review articles, le-
gal encyclopedias, etc.).
26
  Primary authority “is the law itself.”
27
  Sec-
ondary authority is generally defined as commentary and analysis on 
the law, written by expert practitioners and academics.
28
  Primary and 
secondary authority, as traditionally conceived, have two important 
things in common.  First, they are legal in the sense that they are ei-
ther direct sources of law or expressly about the law.  Second, they 
have been published in books, controlled by the legal publishing 
market for at least the last century.
29
  Both of these factors are intert-
wined and are important for understanding the ways in which the le-
gal research environment, and authority itself, has changed. 
1. Primary Authority 
Primary authority is the term used to describe rules of law that 
emanate from lawmaking bodies such as courts, legislatures, and ad-
ministrative agencies.
30
  Because these bodies are constitutionally em-
 
 24 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935 (2008). 
 25 Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2000). 
 26 See BARKAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 10; OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 23, at 17–
19; OLSON, supra note 23, at 7; SLOAN, supra note 23, at 4. 
 27 OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 23, at 17. 
 28 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 12. 
 29 Berring, supra note 25, at 1680–81; Hanson, supra note 16, at 566–69. 
 30 BARKAN, supra note 23, at 2. 
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powered to “make law,” the documents they produce are automatical-
ly authoritative.
31
  Even the term “primary authority” suggests that this 
authority is more important and more authoritative than other kinds 
of authority.  It is authority conferred by the status of its author or 
origin.
32
  Primary authority carries the highest status because in our 
system of precedent and stare decisis, decisions by courts, as well as 
legislative enactments, carry automatic weight regardless of the 
strength of their content. 
Court decisions and legislative enactments are authoritative not 
only because they come from governmental entities with the power to 
make law but also because of where they are published.
33
  Judicial 
opinions published in the National Reporter System and statutes pub-
lished in official codes are unquestionably accepted as official and ac-
curate sources of law.
34
  A legal reader who encounters a citation to a 
case in the United States Reports will understand that the source is a 
Supreme Court opinion and will not question the validity or authen-
ticity of that source.  Likewise, legal researchers implicitly understand 
that cases published in reporters and statutes published in code com-
pilations, or accessed through their online equivalents on Westlaw 
and Lexis, are primary authority.  It is the combination of the source 
of information and its location that gives the document its authority 
without regard for its content. 
In addition to learning that primary authority is “the law,” novice 
legal researchers are also introduced to the concept of “weight of au-
thority”—the degree to which an authority controls the answer to a 
legal question.
35
  Primary authority is typically divided into mandatory 
(or binding) authority and persuasive authority.
36
  One of the central 
features of the common law system is the doctrine of stare decisis, 
which dictates that the rule of law from a case is binding in subse-
quent cases on courts from the same jurisdiction.
37
  Similarly, a lower 
court is bound by judicial opinions from a court higher up the chain 
of command.
38
  So, for example, a judge in the Eastern District of 
 
 31 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1936–39. 
 32 Id. at 1939. 
 33 Berring, supra note 25, at 1692–95. 
 34 Id.  Not coincidentally, these are the publications that must be cited as the 
source for these primary authorities.  See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF 
CITATION, supra note 17, R. 18.2, at 165, 215 tbl.T.10; ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A 
PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION, supra note 17, R. 38.1(a)(1) at 291. 
 35 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 5. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
 38 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 6. 
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Pennsylvania is required to follow decisions issued by the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court but is not obli-
gated to follow a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Authority that is not binding but is relied upon to give credence to a 
point is called persuasive authority.
39
  Thus, the Second Circuit deci-
sion is persuasive, non-binding authority for the Third Circuit. 
A judge faced with persuasive authority has discretion over 
whether to follow the authority or how much credence to give it.  
Thus, the strength of persuasive authority depends on the reader’s 
perception of its value.  Texts are not binding, but still authoritative, 
when, although coming from outside the jurisdiction, the sources 
command respect, either through position or expertise.  The status of 
the author or origin again comes in to play in traditional notions of 
what is considered to be authoritative.  For example, a judge from the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, when faced with an issue of adminis-
trative law, may turn to opinions from the D.C. Circuit, a court noted 
for its expertise in administrative matters,
40
 even though the Eastern 
District is not bound by cases from that court.  Likewise, the Second 
Circuit’s reputation for expertise in securities law increases the like-
lihood that it will be cited in other jurisdictions dealing with securi-
ties issues.
41
 
Even if a court does not have particular substantive expertise, 
the mere fact that another court has already considered an issue fac-
ing a judge gives that earlier opinion some level of authority.
42
  Simply 
being “the law” gives primary authority a certain degree of respect, 
irrespective of its content, though the source of that law may have an 
effect on how valuable the authority is perceived to be.
43
  Because of 
 
 39 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1948–49.  Professor Schauer suggests that “persua-
sive authority” is a misnomer, and that this kind of authority should really be called 
“optional authority” since it is being cited not for its persuasive content but for the 
authority of its source.  Id. at 1946. 
 40 See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Peevey, 413 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J., 
concurring) (remarking that “[t]he D.C. Circuit . . . has particular expertise in ad-
ministrative law”). 
 41 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1958. 
 42 Id. at 1945. 
 43 One type of primary, persuasive authority that has generated a great deal of 
controversy recently, is the use of foreign authority.  See generally Austin L. Parrish, 
Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 
(2007).  Technically, foreign authority is primary authority from another country 
and thus persuasive in a U.S. court.  There has been much misunderstanding about 
the way courts use foreign authority.  See Howard Wasserman, Misunderstanding Judg-
ing: Foreign Law, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 16, 2009, 4:20 PM), http://prawfsblawg. 
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/07/misunderstanding-judging-foreign-law.html. 
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the status of the author (judge or legislator), as signaled in the cita-
tion by the publication (reporter or code), primary authority, even 
when “merely persuasive” or “optional,” has traditionally been consi-
dered preferable to secondary legal authority as support for legal 
analysis.
44
 
2. Secondary Authority 
Secondary authority is the other major type of authority new law 
students are introduced to during their initial legal research instruc-
tion.  While there is no official definition, secondary authority is gen-
erally considered to be commentary and analysis on the law.
45
  The 
most typical types of secondary authority include legal encyclope-
dias,
46
 annotations,
47
 legal periodicals,
48
 and treatises.
49
  A simple way 
of understanding traditional secondary sources is that they are ad-
dressed to a legal audience.
50
  New legal researchers are taught that 
these sources are useful for gaining general background about the 
law, but should rarely be cited directly in support of legal analysis.
51
  
Secondary sources are never binding on any court, but like nonbind-
ing legal authority, they command a certain level of respect as author-
ity either because of the breadth of coverage or the expertise of the 
authors. 
Like primary authority, secondary authority has traditionally 
been limited to writing about the law, published in a limited universe 
of sources controlled by the legal publishing industry.
52
  A legal read-
er who sees a citation to an article in the Harvard Law Review or 
 
 44 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 4–5; THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, 
supra note 17, R.1.4, at 56. 
 45 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 12. 
 46 Legal encyclopedias provide general information about a wide variety of legal 
subjects.  They include the national publications Corpus Juris Secundum and Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, as well as several state-specific encyclopedias. 
 47 Annotations such as American Law Reports collect summaries of cases from a 
variety of jurisdictions to provide an overview of the law on a topic.  See SLOAN, supra 
note 23, at 40.  
 48 Most commonly, these are articles written by legal academics, published in law 
reviews or journals based at law schools.  See SLOAN, supra note 23, at 36. 
 49 Treatises generally provide an in-depth treatment of a particular area of law.  
Well known treatises include books such as W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984) and JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW (McNaughton ed., 1961).  
 50 Wes Daniels, “Far Beyond the Law Reports”: Secondary Source Citation in United 
States Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 3 
(1983). 
 51 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 29–30. 
 52 Berring, supra note 25, at 1680–81; Hanson, supra note 16, at 566–69. 
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Moore’s Federal Practice will understand the nature of the publication 
and make assumptions about the validity of its content and thus 
perceive the source as authority supporting the point for which it is 
cited.  The greater the status of the publication, the more likely the 
secondary source will be recognized as authority; a treatise by a well-
regarded author or a journal article from a highly-ranked law review 
is likely to be viewed as more valuable secondary authority than that 
from a lesser-known source.
53
  Thus, like primary authority, secondary 
authority gains its authoritativeness in large part based on the books 
in which it is published. 
Secondary sources were not always clearly recognized as a form 
of legal authority.  It used to be the rule in England that secondary 
source material could only be cited if the author were dead.
54
  Prior 
to the twentieth century in the United States, secondary sources were 
rarely cited in judicial opinions.
55
  By the later part of the twentieth 
century, however, citations to secondary sources became quite preva-
lent.
56
  There are likely several reasons for this.  First, many common 
secondary sources such as law reviews and the Restatements were not 
developed and widely available before the twentieth century.
57
  
Second, the very citation of secondary sources validated their use as 
authority.  Once one judge cited a secondary source, other judges 
and lawyers became less hesitant to do so, and the effect snowballed 
until the reliance on secondary sources as authority became com-
mon.
58
  In any case, today, secondary sources are viewed as a valid 
form of legal authority, as evidenced by their widespread citation in 
judicial opinions. 
 
 53 See Schauer, supra note 24, at 1957–59 (discussing how secondary sources be-
come authoritative); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by 
the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI  L. REV. 1051, 1054 
(1990) (noting that while the Courts of Appeals generally cite fewer law journals 
than the Supreme Court, those cited are predominantly from elite journals); Louis J. 
Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Em-
pirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 132 (1986–1987) (noting the dominance of elite 
law journals among Supreme Court citations to legal periodicals).  
 54 Federick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1088–89 (1997). 
 55 See Berring, supra note 25, at 1684–87 (noting that a review of Volume 175 of 
the United States Reports from 1899 shows that the Court relied on statutes, cases, and 
the record below, but very little else); Daniels, supra note 50, at 4 (noting a signifi-
cant increase in the Court’s use of secondary sources over the course of the twentieth 
century). 
 56 Daniels, supra note 50, at 4–5. 
 57 Berring, supra note 25, at 1687. 
 58 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1957. 
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B. Nonlegal Authority 
As the term suggests, nonlegal authority is information that is 
not explicitly “about the law” and not directed at a legal audience but 
that is nonetheless used as authority in support of legal analysis.  
Nonlegal sources encapsulate the universe of information outside the 
traditional legal authority described above, ranging from classical 
philosophy, to dictionary definitions, to social science data, to daily 
newspapers.
59
  The majority of nonlegal sources provide factual in-
formation.
60
  Used as authority, these sources support the legal rea-
soning of the court. 
If binding, primary authority is at the top of the hierarchy of 
traditional legal authority, then nonlegal sources are at the bottom.
61
  
Under traditional notions of precedent and stare decisis, nonlegal 
sources carry no weight at all.  Yet, like secondary sources, their ap-
pearance in judicial opinions has increased over time.
62
  Also, like 
secondary sources, since nonlegal sources have no inherent power to 
sway the court, the perception of expertise and reputation of the au-
thor contributes greatly to the persuasive power of these sources. 
Nonlegal sources have long been used in judicial opinions, but 
very infrequently and, until relatively recently, from a limited number 
of sources.
63
  For example, in 1950, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
cited to Life magazine and the United States Supreme Court cited the 
Harvard Business Review, but there were few other nonlegal citations,  
 
 59 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 502–03.  In defining the difference between 
legal and nonlegal information, Schauer and Wise include all government informa-
tion in the “legal” category.  Id. at 499.  This author, however, considers government 
information to be classified as legal authority only when it is being used as a form of 
legislative history.  When government information is being used directly by the 
courts in support of their analysis of the law (as opposed to their analysis of the legis-
lature’s understanding of the law), this author submits that the information plays the 
role of nonlegal authority.  
 60 Factual information used by the courts falls into two categories—adjudicative 
facts and legislative facts.  Legislative facts can be recognized and used by a court 
without the need for judicial notice, or adjudication below.  See generally Ellie Margo-
lis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Nonlegal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 197 (2000).  For purposes of this paper, the term “nonlegal authority” refers 
to sources used to support the legal analysis, not the adjudicative facts. 
 61 The use of nonlegal materials by courts has been controversial and often criti-
cized.  Nonetheless, the citation of such material continues.  This Article does not 
address the controversy, or wisdom, of courts’ reliance on these materials, but ac-
cepts the reality that they are used and explores some of the reasons why. 
 62 Berring, supra note 25, at 1688–91; Hasko, supra note 19, at 429–31, 431 tbl.1; 
William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 
LAW LIBR. J. 267, 286–91 (2002).  
 63 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 496.  
MARGOLIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:04 PM 
920 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:909 
and most of those were citations to the dictionary.
64
  Indeed, a study 
of the United States Supreme Court citation practices revealed that, 
with one exception, all of the nonlegal citations cited in the years 
1940 and 1978 were to dictionaries.
65
 
As several studies have shown, however, the use of nonlegal ma-
terials in judicial opinions increased significantly over the course of 
the twentieth century.  For example, one study found that citations to 
nonlegal sources from 1900 to 1978 increased by 1,429%.
66
  Another 
study of the United States Supreme Court, looking at cases from the 
October Term 1989 though the October Term 1998, found that non-
legal citations appeared in forty percent of the signed opinions.
67
  
Since 1990, the citation to nonlegal sources by the Supreme Court 
has again increased dramatically, even accounting for the number of 
overall citations, number of clerks, and number of pages produced by 
the Court.
68
  The same trend can also be seen in the lower federal 
courts and state courts.
69
 
In addition to the numbers of nonlegal citations increasing, the 
variety of sources relied on by the courts has also increased signifi-
cantly.  Daily newspapers have seen an increase, not only in number, 
but in the variety of papers cited.
70
  Recent citation studies show that 
“virtually every discipline, scientific or not, has become fair game for 
citation.”
71
  More recent cases cite to textbooks and academic journals 
in the areas of economics, political science, sociology, psychology, 
medicine, criminology, and pharmacology.
72
  In addition, judges have 
also cited to sources only available on the Internet, such as blogs,
73
 
Wikipedia,
74
 and Mapquest
75
. 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Daniels, supra note 50, at 19. 
 66 Id. at 4. 
 67 Hasko, supra note 19, at 430. 
 68 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 497. 
 69 Id.  See generally Robert Timothy Reagan, A Snapshot of Briefs, Opinions and Cita-
tions in Federal Appeals, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321 (2006).  For a fuller review of 
nonlegal, electronic citations in the Supreme Court and Federal Circuits, see infra 
section IV. 
 70 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 503. 
 71 Hasko, supra note 19, at 442. 
 72 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 503. 
 73 Margolis, supra note 12, at 116; Cases Citing Legal Blogs—Updated List, LAW X.0 
(Aug. 6, 2006), http://3lepiphany.typepad.com/3l_epiphany/2006/08/ 
cases_citing_le.html; Dave Hoffman, Court Citation of Blogs: Updated 2007 Study, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 26, 2007, 6:52 PM), http://www.concurring 
opinions.com/archives/2007/07/court_citation.html. 
 74 See Peoples, supra note 22, at 7–11. 
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The fact that nonlegal citations in opinions are increasing does 
not necessarily mean that those nonlegal sources are being used as 
authority, but a review of the cases suggests that many of them are.
76
  
While there is no doubt that judges look first to primary authority in 
support of their analysis, judicial opinions also include citations to 
dictionaries, social science data, and materials from a variety of aca-
demic disciplines.  In cases of first impression, courts cite nonlegal 
information, particularly in the form of legislative facts, to support 
the court’s reasoning.
77
  When there is no controlling precedent di-
rectly on point, courts can, and do, cite other sources in support of 
their propositions.  This is the likely explanation for the relatively 
larger numbers of nonlegal citations in U.S. Supreme Court opi-
nions, where there are no directly binding cases and the Court is 
most often dealing with issues of first impression. 
The citation conventions of legal writing instruct that some cita-
tion is better than no citation.  The culture of citation is so en-
trenched that the mere fact of a citation lends some authority to the 
statement being cited.
78
  In essence, the author is claiming that she 
was not the first to assert the point, and thus, because someone else 
said it first, it must be correct.
79
  Since there are typically no formal 
rules setting limits on what is considered a legitimate citation,
80
 when 
 
 75 See generally David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, Judicial Ethics and the Internet: 
May Judges Search the Internet in Evaluating and Deciding a Case?, 16 PROF. LAW. 2 
(2005). 
 76 See infra section IV. 
 77 Margolis, supra note 60, at 219.  Courts must take judicial notice of non-record 
factual information used to assess the factual situation, but the rules of evidence do 
not require judicial notice of “legislative facts,” which are facts used to help the court 
determine what the law is.  
 78 See Schauer, supra note 24, at 1949–50. 
 79 See id. at 1950 (indicating that “the conventions seem to require that a proposi-
tion be supported by a reference to some court (or other source) that has previously 
reached that conclusion”). 
 80 Id. at 1957.  The chief exception here is the restriction of citation to unpub-
lished opinions, a restriction that has been the subject of much controversy.  See Sa-
rah E. Ricks, A Modest Proposal for Regulating Unpublished, Non-Precedential Federal Appel-
late Opinions While Courts and Litigants Adapt to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
32.1, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 17, 21–22 (2007); Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About 
Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1429, 1464–65 (2005).  The recent change in the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure allowing citation means that these restrictions exist now only in 
some states.  See Margolis, supra note 12, at 112–13; Ricks, supra, at 22–24.  Other cita-
tion practices, such as citation to foreign authority, have been controversial, but 
there are technically no restrictions on their use, and such authority plays the role of 
any other secondary or even nonlegal authority when relied on in support of legal 
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a source is used as authority, it becomes authority.  Thus, as nonlegal 
sources are being cited increasingly, they increasingly take on the 
mantle of authority. 
It should be no surprise that many citations to nonlegal authori-
ty are to sources found on the Internet.  The number of citations to 
the Internet has increased steadily over the last two decades.
81
  Since 
citation rules generally require citation to print versions of legal ma-
terials when such versions exist,
82
 and most primary and secondary le-
gal authority is available in print,
83
 it stands to reason that the majori-
ty of electronic citations in judicial opinions are to nonlegal sources.  
Indeed, part of the reason nonlegal sources are now cited more fre-
quently is that they are more easily available on the Internet than 
they were through traditional print research.
84
 
The rise in citation to nonlegal authority signals a loosening of 
the firm boundaries of primary and secondary legal authority which 
have been the dominant paradigm for so long.  There are two inter-
related reasons for this trend.  First, changes in legal publishing and 
electronic search technologies are making it increasingly difficult for 
the current generation of legal researchers to distinguish easily be-
tween types of authority and their relative weight.  Second, the in-
crease in nonlegal citations in opinions sends the signal to lawyers 
that reliance on these sources is acceptable and, in turn, leads to 
their increased use.  The remainder of this paper will address these 
two factors in more depth. 
III. ELECTRONIC RESEARCH AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 
The shift to electronic research over the last decade has been 
well documented.
85
  Less clear, though, is whether the results of elec-
tronic research have yielded different results than running the same 
searches through print media.  Some scholars have suggested that 
“the format change [of legal research] has not truly altered the func-
 
reasoning.  See Austin L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of For-
eign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 655–56 (2007). 
 81 See infra Part IV. 
 82 See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, supra note 17, R. 18.2, at 
165; ALWD: A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION, supra note 17, at app. 2 (reviewing 
local court rules showing preference for print citation unless not available). 
 83 The only exception is that there are a growing number of local and administra-
tive regulations published only online.  See Margolis, supra note 12, at 112–13. 
 84 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 510. 
 85 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 12, at 246; Kuh, supra note 11, at 224–26; Mar-
golis, supra note 12, at 107–08. 
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tional basis of the materials of legal research themselves.”
86
  Others 
have allowed for the possibility that the shift to electronic research 
will give rise to changes in the development of doctrine as well as the 
practice of law.
87
  It is becoming increasingly apparent that recent 
generations of legal researchers are looking at research results very 
differently, and that this is changing the nature of legal authority it-
self. 
Robert Berring has suggested that the change in the world of le-
gal information has been so significant that it has created a “genera-
tion gap” between lawyers who learned legal research before approx-
imately 1995 and those who have learned to research since the online 
revolution.
88
  The changes in legal research are affected by the 
changes in technology in two important ways.  First, the changes from 
accessing legal materials in books to accessing them online have 
created both physical and cognitive barriers to distinguishing be-
tween types of legal authority, as well as between legal and nonlegal 
sources.  Second, the search technology itself, combined with 
changes in the publication of legal information, leads legal research-
ers to search differently and focus on different results than traditional 
print research.  These two factors combine to have a profound effect 
on what legal researchers focus on, see as relevant, and use as author-
ity.  The external clues which reinforce notions of authority in the 
print-based world do not exist in the online world.  The technology 
driven changes do more than change the way we access legal mate-
rials.  Indeed, they make it increasingly difficult to determine just 
what counts as “law” at all. 
A. On the Internet, Everything Looks the Same 
Legal scholars have long posited that changes in the way that law 
is communicated have influenced legal analysis and the development 
of the law.
89
  For example, the shift from oral to written communica-
tion helped create and reinforce the notion that texts are authorita-
 
 86 Berring, supra note 13, at 306. 
 87 Kuh, supra note 11, at 228. 
 88 Berring, supra note 13, at 305. 
 89 See Kuh, supra note 11, at 230 n.24 (citing M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 17–48 (1988); Robert Berring, Legal Research 
and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 21–23 (1987); Ro-
nald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 513–35 (1992); 
M. Ethan Katsh, Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New Media and 
the Future of Law, 8 NOVA L.J. 631 (1984)). 
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tive and laid the groundwork for the concept of binding precedent.
90
  
Because written decisions allowed readers to point to a concrete 
source, lawyers were able to argue that earlier decisions of courts 
should control later decisions.
91
  This foundational concept of legal 
authority could not have existed without the printed text.  In addi-
tion, Robert Berring has written extensively on how the categoriza-
tion of the common law, begun in Blackstone’s Commentaries and car-
ried through the West American Digest System, created a kind of 
“cognitive authority” in the common research tools that shaped the 
way lawyers think about the law.
92
  Although they were not officially 
sanctioned by any court or legislature, the print volumes of the Na-
tional Reporter System, West American Digest System, annotated 
codes, and Shepard’s citators unquestionably carried the weight of 
legal authority for any legal researcher in the twentieth century.
93
  
While some scholars have questioned the relationship between the 
medium of legal communication and its substance,
94
 there can be lit-
tle doubt that there are some very real consequences of the shift to 
electronic research. 
Because we are still just at the beginning of the shift from print 
to electronic media, we can only begin to assess the changes that have 
been wrought.  There are two key ways, however, that print-based re-
search reinforces the legal researcher’s understanding of legal au-
thority in ways that electronic media does not.  First, the physical real-
ity of print sources created a “bright-line border” between legal 
information and other kinds of information.
95
  Second, the organiza-
tion and categorization of legal materials contributed to the idea of 
law as a distinct domain,
96
 which reinforced the idea that there is a 
 
 90 Collins & Skover, supra note 89, at 533; Richard J. Ross, Communications Revolu-
tions and Legal Culture: An Elusive Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 637, 641 (2002). 
 91 KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW, supra note 
89, at 33. 
 92 Berring, supra note 13, at 307–10; see also Katsh, supra note 89, at 658 n.91 (not-
ing that the digests “subtly shaped the attitudes of generations of lawyers and law 
students about the degree of order and orderliness that existed in the legal system”). 
 93 Berring, supra note 25, at 1680–81. 
 94 See, e.g., Nazareth A. M. Pantaloni, III, Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the 
Legal Order, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 679, 682–84 (1994) (questioning whether changes in 
printing and other communication technologies have a direct effect on societal and 
cultural changes); Ross, supra note 90, at 642 (questioning whether there is a causal 
connection between changes in communication and legal developments). 
 95 Berring, supra note 13, at 311. 
 96 Hanson, supra note 16, at 571.  This idea of law as a distinct domain is also re-
flected in the legal academic literature.  See, e.g., Jane Baron, The Rhetoric of Law and 
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firm line between what is law and what is not law.  Thus, print re-
sources give the legal researcher clear signals about the nature of au-
thority, signals which are absent in electronic sources. 
For most of the last two centuries, legal authority was easily iden-
tified and located through a “stable universe of settled sources.”
97
  Le-
gal researchers understood that certain books contained reliable le-
gal authority.  For example, a legal researcher looking at the statutory 
text in the U.S. Code Annotated
98
 would have no doubt that it was a 
source of primary legal authority that is both reliable and accurate.  
Similarly, a researcher would understand that what she was looking at 
in the Supreme Court Reporter is a case authored by the Supreme Court, 
and is thus a source of primary legal authority.  Even in series such as 
the Federal Reporter or the Atlantic Reporter, where cases from more 
than one jurisdiction are collected, the contents of the books are 
made entirely of cases—primary authority produced by courts.  Law 
books even look different from many other types of publications—
rows and rows of tan books with red and black stripes
99
 or maroon 
books,
100
 all lined up volume after volume.  A researcher holding one 
of these books in hand has no doubt that it contains accurate, relia-
ble primary authority.
101
  The mere fact that a case was published and 
physically exists in a volume of the National Reporter System tells the le-
gal researcher that the case is a valid source of authority. 
In contrast, when accessing materials electronically, the re-
searcher is viewing a computer screen, the same screen the person 
would look at to check e-mail, catch up on the latest blogs, check the 
weather, or shop for shoes.  The source is not isolated in a separate 
location.  There is no obvious visual cue to tell the reader that what is 
being viewed is a source of primary authority, nor  are there obvious 
visual cues that separate legal authority from other authority. 
The lack of physical and visual cues is particularly salient for no-
vice legal researchers, who may not fully understand the importance 
of using the official, primary source as authority to support legal 
 
Literature: A Skeptical View, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2273, 2274 (2005) (noting that the law 
and literature movement treats law as a separate domain). 
 97 Berring, supra note 25, at 1675. 
 98 Most legal researchers use this version of the U.S. Code in conducting legal 
research.  See id. at 1680. 
 99 The National Reporter System books, including the Supreme Court Reporter, Fed-
eral Reporter, Federal Supplement, and all of the regional reporters.  
 100 UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED. 
 101 Legal research courses have typically focused on how to access and use these 
books, without questioning the nature of their authority.  See Berring, supra note 25, 
at 1681. 
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion of 
petitioner Celotex Corporation for summary judgment against respondent Catrett 
because the latter was unable to produce evidence in support of her allegation in 
her wrongful-death complaint that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner’s 
asbestos products. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed, however, holding that petitioner’s failure to support its 
motion with evidence tending to negate such exposure precluded the entry of 
summary judgment in its favor. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 
U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181 (1985). This view conflicted with that of the 
Third Circuit in In re Japanese **2551 Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), 
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).1 We granted certi-
orari to resolve the conflict, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 342, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985), 
and now reverse the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit. 
analysis.  Even when a researcher thinks she is viewing a source of 
primary authority, this may not be the case.  Although the source on 
the screen may look like primary authority, unless the researcher has 
taken care to ensure that the database from which the case was ac-
cessed contains the official version, it is quite possible that the online 
source is not actually the primary, controlling authority the research-
er believes she is viewing. 
As an example, in addition to fee-paid sites such as Lexis and 
Westlaw, multiple free websites now provide access to Supreme Court 
cases.  A legal researcher, hoping to contain costs, may go first to one 
of the free sites.
102
  A case viewed on a free site looks much like a case 
accessed on Westlaw.  For example, the opening paragraph of the 
case Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
103
 accessed from Westlaw looks like this:
104
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 247–49; Margolis, supra note 12, at 108. 
 103 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 104 This paragraph was cut-and-pasted from the Celotex case as viewed from Wes-
tlaw.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (Westlaw), available at 
http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=WLW10.06&ifm=NotSet&fn=_top&sv=S
plit&cite=477+U.S.+317&vr=2.0&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&mt=208 (last accessed 
Apr. 11, 2011). 
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The same case, accessed by a search for the case name in Google 
Scholar’s database of legal opinions and articles looks like this:
105
 
 
 
 
The two cases look virtually identical, including the hypertext 
links to the citations.  A careful review, however, shows that the Wes-
tlaw version contains parallel citations, while the Google version does 
not.  This suggests that the two versions were culled from different 
sources.  The Westlaw version carries the cognitive authority of the 
West name, while it is impossible to determine (at least on the web-
site itself) the source of the Google version.  To the modern legal re-
searcher, for whom one source looks much like another, this distinc-
tion is likely to go unnoticed.
106
  Without the physical presence of the 
book, today’s researcher is likely to be less attuned to that cognitive 
authority, contributing to the blurring of the boundaries of tradition-
al authority. 
Another example of this dichotomy can be seen in the contro-
versy over “unpublished”
107
 judicial opinions.  Prior to the mid-1980s, 
unpublished judicial opinions were not widely available because they 
existed only at the courthouse or in the hands of the parties them-
 
 105 This paragraph was cut-and-pasted from the Celotex case as viewed from Google 
Scholar.  See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317 (Google Scholar), available at 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=774572446857633137&q=celotex&hl=
en&as_sdt=800000000002 (last accessed Apr. 11, 2011). 
 106 See generally William R. Mills, The Decline and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm: 
Trustworthiness of Case Reports in the Digital Age, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 917 (2008–2009) 
(noting that legal writers routinely use the book citation for sources found online 
without considering the possibility that the print version of the source may differ 
from the online source they actually used). 
 107 “Unpublished” is something of a misnomer because these opinions, which 
have been designated as non-precedential by the issuing court, are in fact currently 
published both online and in print in West’s Federal Appendix.  Margolis, supra note 
12, at 113. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion 
of petitioner Celotex Corporation for summary judgment against respondent 
Catrett because the latter was unable to produce evidence in support of her 
allegation in her wrongful-death complaint that the decedent had been ex-
posed to petitioner's asbestos products. A divided panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, however, holding that peti-
tioner's failure to support its motion with evidence tending to negate such 
exposure precluded the entry of summary judgment in its favor. Catrett v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 244 U. S. App. D. C. 160, 756 F. 2d 181 (1985). This view 
conflicted with that of the Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 
F. 2d 238(1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986).[1] We granted certiorari to resolve 
the conflict, 474 U. S. 944 (1985), and now reverse the decision of the District 
of Columbia Circuit. 
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selves.
108
  Now, however, they are easily accessible online through a 
variety of sources, including commercial legal research sites and 
courts’ own websites.
109
  When viewed online, there is no visible dif-
ference between an unpublished and a published opinion, thus giv-
ing the reader no clear signal about the difference in the weight of 
authority. 
Similarly, there may be very little difference, other than content 
and writing style, between a social science article and a judicial opi-
nion.  For example, in the recent case of Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme 
Court cited to a report posted on a private website to support the 
proposition that child abduction can cause psychological problems.
110
  
Viewed on the website, the opening paragraph of the report that the 
Court cites looks like this:
111
 
 
 
 
 The text of the report on the screen looks very much like any 
other online text.  It could just as easily be the text of a judicial opi-
nion or a news article.  On the Internet, virtually all text on a screen 
looks alike.  Untethered from the physical reality of books, there is no 
clear delineation between legal authority and other kinds of informa-
tion. 
 
 108 Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethi-
cal Problems and Legal Malpractice, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 204–05 (2006–2007). 
 109 Mills, supra note 106, at 930–31 (documenting the history of unpublished opi-
nions made available on commercial websites).  In addition, the E-Government Act 
of 2002, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006), mandated that all federal courts main-
tain websites to provide access to all their written opinions, including those that had 
not been designated for publication. 
 110 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1996 (2010) (citing Nancy Faulkner, Parental Child Abduction is 
Child Abuse, PANDORA’S BOX, http://www.prevent-abuse-now.com/unreport.htm (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2011)). 
 111 This paragraph was cut-and-pasted from the Pandora’s Box website. PANDORA’S 
BOX, http://www.prevent-abuse-now.com/unreport.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  
See Faulkner, supra note 110. 
Because of the harmful effects on children, parental kidnapping has been 
characterized as a form of child abuse" reports Patricia Hoff, Legal Director 
for the Parental Abduction Training and Dissemination Project, American 
Bar Association on Children and the Law. Hoff explains: 
  
"Abducted children suffer emotionally and sometimes physically at the 
hands of abductor-parents. Many children are told the other parent is 
dead or no longer loves them. Uprooted from family and friends, ab-
ducted children often are given new names by their abductor-parents 
and instructed not to reveal their real names or where they lived be-
fore." (Hoff, 1997)  
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B. Legal Research Technology: A Paradigm Shift 
The transition to online legal research has fundamentally 
changed the relationship between the legal researcher and the 
sources.  While early forms of electronic research may have involved 
the transplanting of print research techniques into the electronic 
format, more recent technologies, combined with major transforma-
tions in the provision of legal information, have wrought fundamen-
tal changes in the way researchers seek and evaluate relevant infor-
mation.
112
  This, too, affects the way that authority is viewed. 
There are several ways in which the online research process con-
tributes to a blurring of the traditional conception of authority.  
These include the loss of the West’s Digests and other indexing sys-
tems as the point of access into primary authority; the development 
of the search engine pulling from multiple sources and databases; the 
ease of accessing volumes of information and the relative ease of 
moving from source to source; and the code architecture of search 
technology, resulting in a greater focus on factual similarity rather 
than legal concepts.  The result of all of these factors is that the re-
searcher focuses less on the source of the material and more on the 
content.  Thus, the focus of authority is no longer on who wrote it 
and where it is published, but instead on the factual content of the 
material.  This is a very different view of authority than has tradition-
ally been held.
113
 
1. The Death of the Digest 
First, and most discussed in the literature, is the loss of structure 
provided by the indexing and digest systems in the print resources.
114
  
Just as the physicality of books reinforces the boundaries of tradition-
al authorities, so too do the finding tools most typically used when 
conducting legal research. 
For at least the last century, legal researchers were taught to lo-
cate primary legal authority through West’s American Digest System 
or other subject indexes tied directly to the print resources they in-
 
 112 See, e.g., Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 286–89; Berring, supra note 13, at 312–14; 
Ian Gallacher, Forty-Two: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Teaching Legal Research to the Google 
Generation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 151, 163–67 (2006); Kuh, supra note 11, at 226; Ross, 
supra note 90, at  640–46.   
 113 See supra notes 89–110 and accompanying text. 
 114 Berring, supra note 25, at 1693–94; Berring, Form Molds Substance, supra note 
89, at 24–27; Berring, supra note 13, at 312–14; Kuh, supra note 11, at 236; Mills, su-
pra note 106, at 920–28. 
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dexed.
115
  The print indexes most typically list subjects alphabetically, 
and the listings contain references, such as citations, leading the re-
searcher to the information.
116
  Like the books to which they refer, 
these indexes reinforce the notion of primary authority by filtering 
the information through the lens of “the law.”  The subject categori-
zation, particularly in the digests, replicates traditional legal catego-
ries originated in Blackstone’s Commentaries.
117
  These categories, 
maintained and modified by the editorial staff of the publications, 
give the researcher some understanding that the source is part of the 
primary authority that makes up “the law.”
118
  This implicit reinforce-
ment of legal categories helps to maintain a clear boundary between 
legal and nonlegal authority.
119
 
Second, the various indexes generally lead only to legal authori-
ty.  For example, the Descriptive Word Index to the U.S. Code leads 
the researcher directly to the statutory provisions of the U.S. Code.  
The key numbers in West’s Federal Practice Digest lead the research-
er directly to cases decided by the federal courts.  The Index to Legal 
Periodicals leads the researcher to law review articles, which while not 
primary authority, are classic sources of secondary legal authority.  A 
researcher using these research tools is only going to find sources of 
legal authority and will thus not even entertain the possibility of using 
nonlegal authority to support legal analysis.  Because they reflect “the 
law” and lead directly to “the law,” the legal indexing systems implicit-
ly reinforce traditional understanding of authority. 
In contrast, electronic research has the potential to lead to non-
legal sources and blur the line between legal and nonlegal sources.  
In the early days of computer-based research, Lexis and Westlaw were 
primarily designed to replicate the National Reporter System.
120
  Wes-
 
 115 The legal research texts focus on finding print resources through tables of 
contents and subject indexes.  See OLSON, supra note 23, at 24, 62, 278–84; SLOAN, su-
pra note 23, at 14, 84–91, 163–68. 
 116 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 291.   
 117 Berring, supra note 13, at 308. 
 118 For more in-depth discussions of how the loss of the digest system may affect 
the way lawyers conceive and understand legal problems, see Berring, supra note 13, 
at 311–14; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same Questions? The 
Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 307, 317–25 (2007); Kuh, supra note 11, 
at 243–46. 
 119 See Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The 
Imperative of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 23 (1994) (discussing the domi-
nant role of the legal information system in the focus on law as finding primary 
sources); Kuh, supra note 11, at 246 (discussing the way in which using digests influ-
ences the ways in which a researcher identifies relevant sources). 
 120 Mills, supra note 106, at 923. 
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tlaw did not initially have full-text search capability, but instead pro-
vided only an online version of the Digest System.
121
  Thus, early 
computer researchers tended to use the same research process they 
were familiar with using to search the books, even when searching on 
the computer.  The newer generations of researchers, however, are 
less likely to be familiar with the indexing systems and less likely to 
replicate the print research in an online format.
122
  Now, instead of 
subject indexes, the point of access in electronic research is the 
search engine.
123
 
The search engine is the vehicle through which material in on-
line databases is accessed.  While there are individual differences in 
search engines, the basic function is the same.  The researcher enters 
search terms into a search box, which then uses an algorithm to re-
trieve results matching those search terms.
124
  In recent years, Westlaw 
and Lexis have moved to appear and function more like search en-
gines on the Internet such as Google, first through natural language 
searches, and more recently through WestlawNext
125
 and Lexis for 
Microsoft Office
126
.  Thus, whether using a fee-paid service or free on-
line website, the legal researcher is likely to conduct research without 
the filter provided by the traditional print legal-indexing systems.
127
 
Unlike the digests and other indexes, in which the researcher 
must use a preexisting legal framework, when using a search engine 
the parameters of the search are entirely up to the researcher.
128
  
Even when searching a database limited to primary authority, such as 
the database of Supreme Court cases on Westlaw, one consequence 
of this type of searching is that the results are dictated only by match-
ing terms, not by concept or area of law.
129
  Searches will yield a 
broader array of sources, not predetermined to fit into the same cat-
egory of legal claim by an editorial staff.  As a result, researchers are 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 259–60; Kuh, supra note 11, at 245. 
 123 Mills, supra note 106, at 932.  See also Berring, supra note 25, at 1706 (predict-
ing that the search engine will replace the National Reporter System as the major fil-
ter of information for legal research).  
 124 See Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 293–95.   
 125 WestlawNext Research System, THOMPSON REUTERS, http://west.thomson.com/ 
westlawnext/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
 126 Lexis for Microsoft Office, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
NewLexis/Office (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  
 127 Mills, supra note 106, at 932 (noting the “growing resistance” to using subject 
indexes when conducting legal research). 
 128 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 297–98; Kuh, supra note 11, at 245. 
 129 Kuh, supra note 11, at 245. 
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likely to think more broadly about what constitutes relevant authority 
for analysis of a particular legal problem.
130
 
Thus, the loss of the digest and other indexing systems as the 
point of access into legal research has created a research environ-
ment in which researchers are less likely to be steered directly to con-
trolling, primary legal authority.  The lack of framing leads research-
ers to think more broadly about what sources are relevant to support 
legal analysis and thus blurs the clear lines of traditional legal author-
ity. 
2. Multiple Sources, Multiple Databases 
Another effect of the search engine as the primary tool of au-
thority is that, unlike the print-research tools, which clearly point to 
sources of legal authority, search engines generally pull from data-
bases containing multiples sources, and even from multiple databases 
at once.  Because legal and nonlegal sources often come up in the 
same search, it is less likely that the researcher will be attuned to the 
differences between primary, secondary, and nonlegal authority. 
As noted above, when using the books and their attendant find-
ing tools, the researcher knows exactly which type of source is being 
viewed.  A researcher running a search through a search engine, 
however, is much less likely to understand how the search engine 
works, or what databases the search results are drawn from.
131
  While 
the online legal research services tend to focus on legal authority, it 
can be difficult to discern the scope of the database or where the in-
formation comes from.  For example, as presented above,
132
 the Wes-
tlaw and Google Scholar versions of the Celotex case appear slightly 
different, but it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to learn where 
the cases came from.
133
 
Not only is the database often unclear, but the researcher can 
use the same strategies, and same search engines, to access both legal 
and nonlegal materials.
134
  A researcher no longer needs to go to a 
law-only database to access legal materials.  As a result, a search via a 
 
 130 Id. at 255–60. 
 131 See Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 298–99 (noting that the average attorney does 
not have the time or patience to learn the research protocols of the research systems 
and is not likely to use them if they are too complicated). 
 132 See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
 133 See Mills, supra note 106, at 934 (“The cases on websites from outside the West 
paradigm derive from a variety of sources and are complied and issued through a va-
riety of processes that are not generally identifiable or subject to scrutiny.”). 
 134 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 510–11.  
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search engine such as Google will yield primary, secondary, and non-
legal sources all in the same search.
135
  Even the legal-research sites 
are moving to platforms that are more likely to yield these multiple 
results.  For example, the new WestlawNext has a search box that 
looks much like Google, and is preset to draw from multiple databas-
es.
136
  While it is possible to select particular databases, the default set-
tings will draw from primary and secondary materials relevant to the 
search topic.
137
 Thus, from the perspective of the researcher, 
“[m]ultiple sources of information merge into one source; one does 
not even feel that one is consulting multiple sources.”
138
 
When information appears to be coming from one source, and 
there are no physical reminders to the researcher that some sources 
are traditional forms of authority and others are not, the researcher is 
much less likely to be attuned to the differences between primary, 
secondary, and nonlegal authority.  Thus, not only the medium of the 
Internet, but also the multiple database search technology contri-
butes to the blurring of the lines between different types of authority. 
3. Low Transaction Costs and Information Overload 
One of the most wonderful aspects of computer-assisted legal re-
search, and one of the most challenging, is the sheer ease of access-
ing information.  A researcher need only type a few words into a 
search engine to receive a voluminous amount of information.
139
  The 
time and energy cost of retrieving information is quite low in compar-
 
 135 For example, the search “hostile work environment” in Google, conducted on 
July 11, 2010, yielded references to an employee rights website (UNDERCOVER LAWYER, 
http://www.undercoverlawyer.com), a Wikipedia definition (Hostile Work Environ-
ment, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostile_work_environment), a pri-
vate attorney’s website (Hostile Work Environment, TIM’S MISSOURI EMPLOYMENT LAW, 
http://www.timslaw.com/hostile-environment.htm), and an article by law professor 
Eugene Volokh (Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harass-
ment Law Restrict?, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.ucla.edu/ 
volokh/harassg.htm), among other results.   
 136 For example, the search “hostile work environment” on WestlawNext, con-
ducted on July 11, 2010, with the database selection of “All Federal,” resulted in Su-
preme Court cases, federal statutes, regulations, administrative decisions, secondary 
sources, briefs, pleadings, motions and memoranda, among other search results. 
 137 See, e.g., Getting Started with Online Research, WESTLAW (2010), available at 
http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/GettingStarted10.pdf. 
 138 Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. 
REV. 403, 465 (1993). 
 139 Sarah Valentine, Legal Research as a Fundamental Skill: A Lifeboat for Students and 
Law Schools, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 189 (2010). 
MARGOLIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  2:04 PM 
934 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:909 
ison to print-based research.
140
  Thus, it is likely that the researcher 
will have a much greater amount of material to sift through in identi-
fying material relevant to the issue being researched. 
Unless the researcher has been careful about limiting the data-
base, the volume of material is likely to obscure the clear lines be-
tween different kinds of authority.
141
  Even a case law search limited to 
a controlling jurisdiction will retrieve unpublished as well as pub-
lished opinions.
142
  Most searches on Westlaw or Lexis will retrieve a 
broader array of primary and secondary sources across multiple juris-
dictions.
143
  Unmediated by the Digest System, the cases retrieved will 
likely touch on a broader array of subjects than those discovered 
through print research.
144
  Research on the Internet will yield an even 
greater variety of primary, secondary, and nonlegal authority.  The 
vast array of materials is likely to de-emphasize the importance of tra-
ditional primary authority.  The researcher is less likely to focus on 
the source and instead to look more broadly at what is relevant, erod-
ing traditional definitions of usable authority. 
In addition to the sheer volume of material facing a researcher, 
hypertext technology
145
 allows the research to move about within the 
document.  For example, the results of a case law search will include 
the case name and a relevant snippet of the material that matches the 
researcher’s search terms.
146
  Because the researcher is “invited to 
jump directly into not just the case text, but the section of the case 
text deemed most responsive to the search terms,”
147
 the researcher is 
less likely to focus on the traditional indicators of authority—which 
court issued the case, where it was published (if at all), how it is cate-
gorized, etc.  Once again, the technology leads the researcher to fo-
cus more directly on the content of the material. 
 
 140 See, e.g., Hanson,  supra note 16, at 576 (noting that what used to take hours of 
tedious work can now be done in minutes); Kuh, supra note 11, at 247 (asserting that 
the lower time and energy costs for electronic research will expose researchers to 
more text during the course of their research); Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 513 
(pointing out that what once would have taken two hours can now be done at “the 
click of a mouse”). 
 141 Valentine, supra note 139, at 189. 
 142 Hanson, supra note 16, at 579–80. 
 143 Valentine, supra note 139, at 194. 
 144 Kuh, supra note 11, at 249. 
 145 Hypertexting allows the researcher to move in a digitized document by open-
ing links to other digitized documents.  Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: 
Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting? 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 910 (2008–2009). 
 146 Kuh, supra note 11, at 246. 
 147 Id. 
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Hypertext technology also makes it easy for the researcher to 
move from document to document in a nonlinear fashion.
148
  For ex-
ample, a researcher may retrieve a case through Google Scholar, and 
while reviewing that case, click on a link to a second case, and so 
on.
149
  Even if a researcher starts in a clearly identified database, as 
she clicks through from one source to another, she may soon lose 
track of whether the source is primary, secondary, or nonlegal au-
thority.  It is no wonder that hypertext technology, in combination 
with the sheer volume of material that electronic searching facilitates, 
has begun to blur the boundaries of authority. 
4. Focus on Facts 
The final factor contributing to the blurred lines between types 
of authority is that the electronic search technology pushes the re-
searcher to focus on facts rather than legal concepts, which rein-
forces a focus on the content of the source material over the authori-
ty of the source’s author or origin.  This is due in part to the lack of 
digests or other classification schemes to inform the researcher and 
in part because of the function of the search technology itself. 
In addition to the effects of the abandonment of the digest and 
similar systems noted above,
150
 another consequence is that, for the 
researcher, there is no context for the results of an electronic search 
beyond the words the researcher has chosen.
151
  Word searching “in-
hibits the searcher’s impetus to seek out overarching legal principles 
within which to base legal arguments.”
152
  Without an understanding 
of how the source fits into the broad context of legal analysis, the re-
searcher is likely to focus more on the factual content of the informa-
tion.  As the focus becomes removed from the law to the facts, the 
understanding of authority as “the law” will also fade. 
This is exacerbated by the search technology which leads the re-
searcher to retrieve sources containing factual similarities rather than 
legal ones.  In a typical electronic search, whether on a fee-paid legal 
database or directly on the Internet, the researcher enters search 
terms into a search box.  The search engine matches those terms 
against whatever database it is designed for and retrieves the results.  
The search returns documents containing exact matches to the 
 
 148 Broussard, supra note 145, at 911. 
 149 Kuh, supra note 11, at 248. 
 150 See supra notes 92–118 and accompanying text. 
 151 Valentine, supra note 139, at 195–96. 
 152 Id. at 196. 
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search terms.
153
  Because the search engine retrieves results based on 
matching terms, there is no indication of any relationship between 
the results,
154
 and indeed no relationship may exist beyond the ap-
pearance of the search terms.  Unless the search has been run 
through a West’s Key Number,
155
 or other classification system, the 
search is likely to yield a much broader array of results not directly re-
lated to the legal principle being researched.
156
 
Several scholars have noted that keyword searching leads the re-
searcher to focus on facts over legal principles.
157
  It is much more dif-
ficult to search for abstract concepts and legal principles because the 
search words are likely to yield a much larger number of results.
158
  
The words used in abstract concepts are more likely to appear in a 
broader variety of sources and the complex relationship between 
words cannot easily be captured by the search technology.
159
  In con-
trast, facts tend to be more narrow and concrete, and thus easier to 
search for.  Younger generations of researchers, who expect to be 
able to plug a few words into a search engine and get answers, are not 
likely to engage in developing sophisticated search strings to find au-
thority in a more conceptual way.
160
 
Because the search technology facilitates a focus on facts, rather 
than legal concepts, the researcher is more likely to be drawn away 
from thinking about law in terms of traditional legal categories.  
Those traditional categories play a significant role in reinforcing tra-
ditional categories of authority.  A researcher focusing on facts is 
going to see factual information as relevant before thinking about the 
source from which it came.  An emphasis on facts as opposed to legal 
doctrine, in addition to the lack of filtering through digests and simi-
lar classification systems and the removal of the physical reminders of 
authority books provide, has resulted in a world of electronic re-
search that lacks the traditional indicators of authority.  This leads re-
searchers to consider a broader array of different kinds of materials 
as relevant support for legal analysis. 
 
 153 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 293.   
 154 Hanson, supra note 16, at 574. 
 155 West’s Key Number System, THOMPSON REUTERS, http://lawschool.westlaw.com/ 
knumbers/default.asp?mainpage=16&subpage=4 (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  
 156 Kuh, supra note 11, at 259. 
 157 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 297; Hanson, supra note 16, at 583.  
 158 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 293–94. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Thomas Keefe, Teaching Legal Research from the Inside Out, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 117, 
122 (2005). 
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IV. ELECTRONIC CITATION IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
In addition to the technology-driven changes in legal research, 
the second major factor in the blurring of the traditional categories 
of authority is the example courts set in judicial opinions.  In an opi-
nion, an internet citation to a nonlegal source sends the message to 
the reader that the source is legitimate, and that it provides good 
support for the proposition being cited.
161
  The more that online 
sources are cited as nonlegal authority, the more accepted they be-
come, and the more accepted they become, the more authoritative 
they become.
162
  From the reader’s perspective, if the court is citing a 
source, it must be a legitimate authority, and thus the boundary be-
tween traditional legal authority and nonlegal authority is blurred.  
There are now a sufficient number of citations to online authority to 
send that message clearly to legal readers and researchers. 
A number of scholars have documented the rise in both internet 
citations and citations to nonlegal authority over the last twenty 
years.
163
  The Judicial Conference of the United States has also noted 
the increasing frequency of judges’ use of internet-based information 
in their opinions.
164
  The increase in citations to internet sources can 
easily be seen by looking at the number of citations in the federal cir-
cuit courts since the mid-1990s, when internet citations first began to 
appear.
165
 
 
 161 See, e.g., Peoples, supra note 22, at 7 (noting that use of Wikipedia as support 
for legal analysis lends authority to Wikipedia as a credible source); Schauer, supra 
note 24, at 1957 (“A citation to a particular source is not only a statement by the citer 
that this is a good source but also a statement that sources of this type are legiti-
mate.”). 
 162 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1957–58. 
 163 See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.  These numbers do not entirely 
overlap.  The rise in citations to nonlegal authority began before the Internet explo-
sion, and at least some of the citations to nonlegal authority are citations to print 
sources rather than the Internet.  See Hasko, supra note 19, at 430–40, 432 tbl.2. 
 164 Memorandum from James C. Duff, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the Unit-
ed States, to Chief Judges, U.S. Courts (May 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.inbar.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=hptDW9DIhFY%3D&tabid=356 
(providing guidelines for judges on citing to, capturing, and maintaining internet 
sources in judicial opinions as well as guidelines on using hyperlinks in opinions). 
 165 Determined by searching each Westlaw circuit court database (“CTA”) for the 
term “http” in the opinion.  
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FIGURE 1 
NUMBER OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT CASES CONTAINING  
INTERNET CITATIONS 
 
Year 
Circuit Court 
 Total 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th DC Fed 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 2 0 10 
1998 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 21 
1999 1 2 3 1 1 1 6 2 6 1 3 4 1 32 
2000 2 3 9 1 3 5 6 4 9 1 6 5 1 55 
2001 4 12 10 4 6 6 11 4 23 15 5 6 5 111 
2002 12 19 15 8 9 6 15 4 51 6 3 14 12 174 
2003 15 21 17 8 6 11 22 8 66 10 10 11 12 217 
2004 15 30 23 17 16 18 43 11 77 17 10 12 14 303 
2005 12 33 23 12 12 26 34 11 51 21 10 10 7 262 
2006 18 61 36 14 9 35 48 11 82 22 13 14 5 368 
2007 14 45 34 12 14 48 56 12 64 34 16 21 21 391 
2008 16 56 33 19 10 48 84 16 85 25 10 32 40 474 
2009 24 40 25 16 14 41 58 12 82 32 21 21 55 441 
Total 135 323 231 115 105 245 384 97 599 186 112 154 173 2859 
 
These numbers represent the individual cases containing inter-
net citations, but not the number of citations themselves.  Many of 
the cases contain more than one citation to online authority, making 
the total number even higher.
166
  As Figure 1 demonstrates, the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals went from no internet citations in 1996 to cita-
tions in the double digits by 2004, eight years later.  The number 
seems to have leveled off somewhat in the last two years, though some 
of the circuits that initially were slow to include electronic citations, 
such as the Federal Circuit, still show significant increases.  While 
Figure 1 encompasses a relatively small percentage of the total cases 
decided by the circuits,
167
 the Internet is sufficiently represented in 
citations to appear to readers as a valid source of authority. 
 
 166 It was beyond the scope of this research project to count individual citations in 
the thousands of federal court cases containing at least one internet citation.  
 167 For example, the 441 cases citing internet sources in 2009 represent 1.6% of 
the 26,828 total cases decided by the circuit courts.  Total numbers were derived by 
searching each CTA for generic terms “court appeal” in the opinion, with dates re-
stricted to each consecutive year.    
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The Supreme Court serves as an even stronger example that on-
line sources are valid authority.  The Court first cited an internet 
source in 1996, when Justice Souter referenced two internet sources 
describing cable modem technology.
168
  Since that time, the Court’s 
use of the Internet has risen dramatically, and by 2002, all of the jus-
tices had used at least one internet citation in an opinion.
169
  Accord-
ing to one study, during the 2004 and 2005 terms, over thirty percent 
of the Court’s opinions contained citations to the Internet.
170
  The 
numbers are similar in the more recent terms.  For example, in the 
Court’s October Term 2009, twenty-eight cases
171
 contained internet 
citations out of the eighty-six cases decided,
172
 for a total of thirty-
three percent.  The highest percentage was for the October Term 
2007, in which twenty-nine cases out of seventy-one, or forty-one per-
cent, contained electronic citations.
173
  As with the circuit court cases, 
the actual number of internet citations is even greater than the num-
ber of opinions, because several opinions contain multiple internet 
citations.
174
 
Yet the number of citations does not tell the whole story.  The 
numbers alone do not make clear the degree to which courts use 
nonlegal information as authority to support legal analysis.  The 
numbers do not show to what extent the sources cited are part of the 
lower court record, or are references to traditional legal authority 
available online.  Although it is still true that citation to traditional 
legal authority far exceeds citation to nonlegal sources,
175
 there are a 
substantial number of examples of significant reliance on nonlegal 
sources, demonstrating that nonlegal sources will serve as a model to 
today’s legal readers. 
 
 168 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 777 n.4 
(1996). 
 169 William R. Wilkerson, The Emergence of Internet Citations in U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 323, 325 (2006). 
 170 Id. at 326.    
 171 Determined by searching the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the term 
“http” in the opinion, with dates restricted between October 2009 and July 2010. 
 172 Memorandum from SCOTUSblog.com on End of Term Statistical Analysis—
October Term 2009 (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/Summary-Memo-070710.pdf.  
 173 Determined by searching the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the term 
“http” in the opinion with dates restricted between October 2008 and July 2008. 
 174 Wilkerson, supra note 169, at 326 tbl.1.  
 175 See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 69, at 328 (noting that citations to published opi-
nions greatly outnumber citations to other sources in a study of federal courts of ap-
peals cases). 
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In their study of citation to nonlegal sources in the United States 
and New Jersey Supreme Courts, Federick Schauer and Virginia Wise 
specifically looked at the use of nonlegal information as authority in 
judicial opinions and found a significant increase in the use of non-
legal materials at the same time as a decrease in traditional secondary 
sources.
176
  This suggests that nonlegal materials play a similar role to 
that of traditional secondary sources in supporting legal analysis, and 
courts are increasingly citing to the Internet for nonlegal sources.  A 
recent study of the citation to Wikipedia in judicial opinions notes a 
number of instances in which courts use Wikipedia to support reason-
ing or define legislative facts.
177
  While there is no way to know the 
degree to which courts are relying on nonlegal sources, as opposed to 
using them as “window dressing,”
178
 the fact that nonlegal sources at 
least appear to play the same role in opinions as traditional sources 
sets an example for legal readers. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s use of nonlegal materials as authority 
provides a good snapshot of the different ways these materials can be 
used.  It should be no surprise that a higher number of nonlegal cita-
tions appear in Supreme Court opinions, since the Court is more 
likely to decide the types of cases where traditional legal authority is 
less helpful.
179
  It is also more likely that nonlegal citations will appear 
in dissents, where judges may be less constrained by traditional legal 
reasoning.  A comprehensive study of the Court’s 1995–2005 terms 
bears this out.
180
 
The study also showed that internet citations are not limited to 
cases addressing particular issues, but instead are present in a wide 
range of cases, including criminal procedure, economic activity, First 
Amendment, civil rights, and judicial power.
181
  The majority of inter-
net citations are to government websites of some kind.
182
  In addition 
to state and federal government documents, the Court has cited 
 
 176 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 506–07. 
 177 Peoples, supra note 22, at 7–11. 
 178 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 513. 
 179 See Margolis, supra note 60, at 221–32 (explaining why nonlegal materials are 
most useful in cases of first impression, cases of statutory interpretation, and consti-
tutional issues). 
 180 Wilkerson, supra note 169, at 329 (finding that forty-four percent of references 
appeared in dissenting opinions, thirty-seven percent in majority or plurality opi-
nions, and nineteen percent in concurring opinions). 
 181 Id. at 329 tbl.3.   
 182 Id. at 330.  In this study, Wilkerson follows the coding categories developed by 
Schauer and Wise, see supra note 59, and classifies all government information as le-
gal.  Wilkerson, supra note 169, at 332. 
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sources on the Internet for documents from other countries, non-
profit and academic research (both legal and nonlegal), commercial 
information, news, and popular culture.
183
 
The Court’s October Term 2009 opinions are not only consis-
tent with these findings, but provide some clear examples of the use 
of nonlegal authority in support of legal reasoning.  In the twenty-
eight cases containing electronic citations, there are a total of sixty-
one electronic citations.
184
  These are fairly evenly divided, with twenty 
citations in majority opinions, eighteen in concurrences or combined 
concurrences and dissents, and twenty-three in dissenting opinions.
185
  
Out of the sixty-one citations to internet sources, three are references 
to the factual circumstances of the case on review.
186
 
Only six of the citations can clearly be classified as references to 
traditional primary or secondary legal authority.
187
  Fourteen out of 
the remaining fifty-two are clearly nonlegal sources, since they are 
references to educational, nonprofit, or commercial websites.
188
  The 
 
 183 Id. at 332 tbl.6.  
 184 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.  See supra note 171 for explanation 
of the source of the October 2009 term statistics. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.) (citing STATE OF TENN., DEP’T. OF CORR.’S, ADMIN. POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES, INDEX # 506.14(VI)(B)(2) (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/506-14.pdf); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. 
Ct. 705, 709 (2010) (citing Press Release, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Federal 
Courthouses to Offer Remote Viewing of Proposition 8 Trial (Jan. 8, 2010), available 
at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/01/08/Prop8_Remote_ 
Viewing_Locations.pdf); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1822, n.8 (2010) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Mojave National Preserve 
Operating Hours & Seasons, DEP’T OF INTERIOR: NATIONAL PARK SERVICES, 
http://www.nps.gov/moja/planyourvisit/hours.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011)).  
 187 For example, in Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010), the Court cites 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy to an online source.  Id. at 2474 (citing FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 3015(b), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/Overview/BankruptcyRules.aspx) (requiring that a plan be filed 
within fourteen days of the filing of a petition).  The Court also cites several law re-
view articles to online, rather than print versions.  See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3089 n.2 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Philip Ham-
burger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557870); Free Enter. Fund v. 
Pub. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3170 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing Harold Bruff, Bringing the Independent Agencies in from the Cold, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
63, 68 (2009), available at http://vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2009/11/Bruff-62-
Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc-63.pdf). 
 188 Determined by the domain name containing .edu, .org, or .com.  See, e.g., 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010) (citing HOFSTRA LAW 
SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK (2009–2010), available at http://law.hofstra.edu/ 
pdf/StudentLife/StudentAffairs/Handbook/stuhb_handbook.pdf); McDonald, 130 
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remaining citations are to government websites,
189
 twenty-four of 
which cite to the federal government.
190
  Thirty-three of the govern-
mental references are to statistical information or other support for 
factual assertions of the Court.
191
 
The remaining citations fall into a gray area.  While they are not 
strictly traditional legal authority, they are much more law-like and 
are used to support legal rather than factual propositions.  For exam-
ple, in Schwab v. Reilly,
192
 the Court cites a Department of Justice 
Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees in support of a statement about the 
proper role of the bankrupt individual’s estimated market value.
193
  
Handbooks of this nature, prepared by the Department of Justice to 
implement the administration of a federal statute, are clearly an in-
terpretation of law much like traditional sources of authority, but do 
not clearly fall into most lawyers’ understanding of primary authority.  
Before handbooks like this were made available online, they were not 
searchable by traditional means of legal research and, if not intro-
duced into the record below, were much less likely to be used as au-
thority.  This gray area provides yet another example of a way in 
which legal authority may be changing. 
While many of the internet citations in Supreme Court opinions 
appear in footnotes and in conjunction with a variety of other cita-
 
S. Ct. at 3135 (citing Regulating Guns in America, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE 
(Feb. 2008), http://www.lcav.org/publications-briefs/regulating_guns.asp); Nurre v. 
Whitehead, 130 S. Ct. 1937, 1938 n.2 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.) (citing David R. Holsinger, ON A HYMNSONG OF PHILIP BLISS (TRN Music Pub-
lisher, Inc. 1989), available at http://trnmusic.com/pdfs/string-orchestra-
pdfs/onahymnsongofphilipblissorch.pdf).  
 189 Determined by the domain name .gov, or other identifying information.  See, 
e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 n.9 (citing Available Emblems of Belief for Placement on 
Government Headstones and Markers, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 
http://www.cem.va.gov/hm/hmemb.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010));  Citizens Unit-
ed v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 941 n.27 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Electioneering Comm’ns Summary, FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, http://fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ECSummary.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 
2011)).  
 190 See supra note 171. 
 191 The high percentage of citations to factual information is consistent with other 
studies finding an increase in citations to nonlegal material.  See supra notes 17, 60, 
169 and accompanying text.  The use of legislative facts in this way raises a serious 
question of whether, and the degree to which, courts are increasingly taking on a leg-
islative role.  Those questions are beyond the scope of this article, but well worth 
considering. 
 192 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
 193 Id. at 2663 (citing DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. TRS., HANDBOOK FOR 
CHAPTER 7 TRS. 8-1 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_ 
trustee/library/chapter07/docs/7handbook1008/Ch7_Handbook.pdf). 
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tions,
194
 there are examples of an opinion relying solely on an inter-
net source.  For example, in his concurring opinion in John Doe No. 1 
v. Reed,
195
 Justice Alito cited a report of the nonprofit Initiative and 
Referendum Institute to make the point that publicly disclosing 
names on a ballot initiative is not necessary to prevent fraud and mis-
take.
196
  A citation like this shows the reader that information from 
nonprofit organizations can serve as valid authority for legal analysis. 
In some cases, the Court uses factual data to reinforce either the 
record below or the legal authority the court is citing.  For example, 
in U.S. v. Comstock,
197
 the majority, in addressing concerns that its 
holding was too broad, cited the record below, as well as online statis-
tics from the Department of Justice to show that the statutory provi-
sion at issue had not been extensively applied.
198
  This type of citation 
sends the message that an assertion is stronger if backed up by au-
thority beyond the record below, and will send lawyers searching for 
factual data to back up their legal assertions. 
Thus, with the example set at the top by the Supreme Court and 
carried through to many of the lower courts, lawyers and law students 
developing an understanding of how authority supports legal analysis 
will see nonlegal sources being used as authority.  In combination 
with the ease of access to a seemingly limitless amount of information 
on the Internet and the loss of traditional markers of authority pro-
vided by print legal research sources, the move to more and different 
uses of nonlegal information as authority will likely continue and in-
crease. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As technology marches forward and the generation of digital na-
tives enters the profession in greater and greater numbers, changes 
 
 194 See, e.g., Nurre v. Whitehead, 130 S. Ct. 1937, 1938 n.2 (2010); Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 941 n.27; Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2245 (2010) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (citing OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, RULE DRAFTING MANUAL 47 (4th 
ed. 2006), available at http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/rules/rdm06_06.pdf).  
 195 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 196 Id. at 2840 (citing INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INST., INITIATIVE USE 1 (Feb. 
2009), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20Initiative%20Use%20(1904-
2008).pdf). 
 197 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (holding that the federal statute allowing a district court 
to order civil commitment beyond the date that a federal prisoner would be released 
is constitutional). 
 198 Id. at 1964 (citing William J. Sabol et al., Prisoners in 2008, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULL. (Dep’t of Justice), Dec. 2009 (Rev. June 2010), at 8 tbl.8, available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf). 
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to the traditional definitions of authority are likely to continue.  If the 
experiences with unpublished opinions
199
 and foreign authority
200
 
have taught us anything, it is that, whether or not their use is contro-
versial, sources will be cited if a lawyer or judge perceives them to 
provide support for a proposition.  The same can be said of nonlegal 
authority. 
While some courts have balked at the citation of nonlegal au-
thority in support of legal analysis,
201
 its use is on the rise, and many 
courts are clearly accepting and using nonlegal authority.  The prob-
lems with citation to online materials are legion.  There is often no 
way to authenticate sources, links may become inactive, and website 
content is subject to change.
202
  Despite these drawbacks, for the gen-
erations that are used to easy access to legal and nonlegal informa-
tion of all kinds, there is no going back. 
This change is happening gradually—but it is happening.  In-
stead of lamenting the loss of traditional definitions of authority, or 
trying to figure out ways to train lawyers to recognize authority in the 
same way they have for the last century, the time has come to find a 
new way.  There is simply too much available information to permit 
the use of any source for any reason—there must be boundaries and 
ways to recognize when a source is authoritative. 
There is much about the new world of electronic legal research 
that is not new.  Lawyers have long had to comb through large 
amounts of information to find relevant sources.  The law is complex, 
and even in the print world researchers had to distinguish among dif-
ferent kinds of primary and secondary authority to recognize the 
most binding and most relevant sources.  The difference today is that 
the way those distinctions were once recognized is not as obvious in 
the world of electronic research.  There is much that is better about 
the easy availability of information on the Internet.  We can find a 
greater number of sources more quickly and we have access to rele-
vant information that may never have been unearthed in a print-
based search.  These improvements, however, bring new challenges. 
 
 199 See Solomon, supra note 108, at 191–201. 
 200 See Parrish, supra note 43, at 680. 
 201 See, e.g., Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the use 
of Wikipedia to establish the meaning of an immigration document). 
 202 For a more in-depth treatment of the problems with authenticity and perma-
nence in internet citations, see Barger, supra note 19, at 438–45; Ching, supra note 
19, at 396–97; Mary Rumsey, Runaway Train: Problems of Permanence, Accessibility, and 
Stability in the Use of Web Sources in Law Review Citations, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 27, 34–37, 35 
tbl.1 (2002). 
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If law is to remain a separate domain, there must be limits on 
the way sources are used to support legal analysis.  But the limitations 
can no longer be rooted in the print sources of the twentieth century, 
and they can no longer be based solely on traditional notions of 
precedent and stare decisis.  If the notion of authority has shifted 
away from who said it, and where it was said, then it must be replaced 
by another system.  It is time for the profession—lawyers, judges, and 
legal academics—to formulate a new system.  We need a new vocabu-
lary for defining authority, and we need new methodologies for 
teaching and learning how to identify relevant nonlegal authority.  
The legal profession should embrace the changes brought about by 
the online revolution and figure out how to make the technological 
advances work in the legal analysis of the future. 
 
